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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the legitimating process of a French higher education institution entirely 
dedicated to entrepreneurship. Management and entrepreneurship education strives both for 
academic and market legitimacies. We think entrepreneurship education is confronted with an 
additional challenge: building political legitimacy. We analyze the “extreme case” study of a 
French business school dedicated to entrepreneurship. We examined the business school’s 
legitimation process over a period of six years, from 2004 to 2010. This “extreme case” may 
be informative for other business schools willing to reach academic, market and political 
legitimacies while at the same time trying to develop a coherent and stable global strategy in a 
competitive higher education landscape. This is the first article dealing with the topic of 
legitimacy acquisition processes, with the aim of emphasizing the institutionalization of 
entrepreneurial mindset in French entrepreneurship higher education.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
French entrepreneurship education has been increasingly gaining ground for the last ten 
years. Entrepreneurship higher education is well integrated into national and European policy 
frameworks aiming to stimulate entrepreneurial spirit and to increase the number of start-ups 
all over the continent. However, entrepreneurship higher education is regularly facing a major 
dilemma: simultaneously achieving academic, market and political legitimacies. According to 
Binks and his colleagues (2006), management and entrepreneurship education have to 
demonstrate both academic and market legitimacies. Younger than management education, 
entrepreneurship education is nevertheless confronted with an additional challenge: building 
political legitimacy, as political actors expect entrepreneurship curricula to significantly 
contribute to economic growth and to the development of the “knowledge-based society” as 
ascribed by the Lisbon Agenda (2006). 
This paper examines the case of a French business school entirely dedicated to 
entrepreneurship education, so as to highlight how the organization “reinvented” itself and 
managed its identity and multiple legitimacies during its first years of existence. A survey of 
EFMD (2008) identified sixteen major European business schools dedicated to 
entrepreneurship. Among them, the business school we researched may be analyzed as an 
“extreme case”, as it is the only French higher institution completely committed to 
entrepreneurship education. As empirical inquiries investigating “a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context” (Yin, 2003: 13), case studies may be particularly 
appropriate for analyzing the dynamics present within particular settings. According to 
Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007), the choice of a single case study may be appropriate when 
exploring new phenomena, on a longitudinal basis. In order to examine the business school’s 
legitimation processes over a period of six years, from 2004 to 2010, we used various sources 
– the school’s archives, curricula and syllabi, interviews with key actors, and participant 
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observation. Our research highlights the tensions that a higher education organization entirely 
dedicated to entrepreneurship encounters when building academic, market and political 
legitimacies and explores their impact on quality assessment. This extreme case may be 
informative for other business schools in the field of entrepreneurship willing to reach 
academic, market and political legitimacies while at the same time trying to develop a 
coherent and stable global strategy in a competitive higher education environment. 
We first investigate the specific issues entrepreneurship education organizations are facing 
when shaping their legitimacy. Then, we focus on the case study research design and 
methodology. The results section shed some light on the legitimation processes of the 
business school, and discusses their impact on the school’s quality assurance management.  
 
II. LITTERATURE REVIEW 
II.1. Building legitimacy in higher education  
Legitimacy has been depicted as a generalized perception that the actions of an 
individual or those of an organization are desirable and appropriate within the current system 
of social norms and values (Suchman, 1995). Organizational legitimacy, defined as “the 
acceptance of the organization by its environment”, is crucial for organizational survival and 
success (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999: 64). Moreover, organizational emergence and 
development are analyzed as a progressive acquisition and transformation of internal and 
external legitimacies, through multiple discourse and action-driven legitimation processes 
(Tornikoski and Newbert, 2007; Golant and Sillince, 2007). From the standpoint of higher 
education organizations, legitimacy is the combined outcome of various legitimation 
processes whereby organizations try to increase congruence between their activities and 
socially defined standards, as well as market expectations (Anderson and Smith, 2007: 486-
488).  
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Legitimation, characterized as “the process through which legitimacy is achieved” 
(Hybels, 1995) is a great challenge for higher education organizations that have to establish 
and maintain different and sometimes divergent legitimacy requirements from national and 
international stakeholders. Rindova, Pollock and Hayward (2006) emphasize that 
organizations build internal and external legitimacy with the intention of enhancing their 
influence on various stakeholders, attracting future clients and employees, and gaining 
financial and public support. However, when it comes to higher education organizations, 
legitimacy is more than just about acquiring notoriety and reputation on a highly competitive 
national and international market (Van Damme, 2001). Building legitimacy in higher 
education is also about conveying a quality message relative to pedagogical contents and 
processes, pedagogical methods and teams, in an attempt to improve both the organization's 
market position and its ability to have an impact on society, culture and educational policies. 
 
II.3. Academic, market and political legitimacies 
Different types of legitimacies may be identified according to the specific position that 
an academic discipline occupies in the general academic field, as defined by particular 
criteria, such as the discipline's centrality, maturity, expansion, etc. Legitimacy reflects a 
field’s “institutional power” (Lyytinen and King, 2004: 223), its theoretical and 
methodological distinctiveness, its applicable research capabilities and perceived value. 
According to Binks and his colleagues (2006), business education needs to demonstrate a 
double legitimacy - academic and market legitimacy. Concerning academic legitimacy, 
national and international accreditation institutions focus on the consistence of pedagogical 
processes linking pedagogical contents and methods to faculty composition and 
organizational design (Van Damme, 2001). Concerning market legitimacy, enterprises and 
clusters focus on the conformity of the business schools' pedagogical content and skill 
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development to the needs of the market and firms (Kipping and Nioche, 1997; Starkey and 
Tiratsoo, 2007). According to Lorange (2005), even though most universities and business 
schools all over the world strive to acquire these two kinds of legitimacy, market and 
academic, they still have some work to do in order to increase their mutual coherence and 
convergence, because academic and market legitimacies may sometimes require different 
quality criteria to be met, and different quality assessment procedures to be implemented.  
Entrepreneurship education also has to build political legitimacy. Entrepreneurship is 
presently given strong impetus by both national and European political actors, with 
entrepreneurship curricula facing intense political pressures to demonstrate ability to produce 
short- and mid- term results, i.e. substantially increase the number of start-ups, create new 
employment opportunities, and contribute to the young enterprises' growth and 
internationalization. As one may notice, academic and market legitimacy rely mostly on 
process and content-based quality indicators, whereas political legitimacy is based on the 
educational system’s short- and mid-term outputs, i.e. precisely those quality indicators most 
difficult to address by a higher education organization (Grant and Perren, 2002). Tensions and 
contradictions between academic, market and political legitimacies may thus become more 
apparent as entrepreneurship education strive to acquire all three of them at the same time. 
 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
III.1. Research objectives  
The objectives of this research were three-fold: a) to develop a framework through 
which to examine the legitimation processes of entrepreneurship higher education 
organizations; this framework links legitimating strategies to specific quality assurance 
indicators in order to allow empirical analysis; b) to test the framework in an empirical setting 
– i.e. an “extreme case” – in order to validate its explanatory power; c) to emphasize the 
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dynamics of identity building and legitimacy acquisition and the tensions among the three 
types of legitimacy as well as their particular quality assurance indicators.  
 To accomplish these objectives, we employed a three-stage approach. We first 
reviewed organizational and social sciences literature on legitimacy and legitimation, and 
elaborated a general framework of legitimation processes for entrepreneurship education 
organizations; then, we identified the potential quality assurance indicators that business 
schools strive to maximize in order to achieve overall legitimacy among their internal and 
external stakeholders (see Table 1). Second, we analyzed the case of a business school 
entirely dedicated to entrepreneurship from 2004 to 2010 to test and refine our framework. 
Third, we used the insights gained from this case study to illustrate the tensions and 
contradictions among quality assurance indicators that entrepreneurship education 
organizations may encounter when trying to achieve legitimacy. 
 
III.2. Case description 
As empirical inquiries investigating “a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context” (Yin, 2003: 13), case studies are useful in exploring the dynamics present within 
particular settings. According to Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007), the choice of a single case 
study (“extreme case study”) may be appropriate when one wants to explore new phenomena 
on a longitudinal basis.  
Eight years ago, a higher education organization of the Paris Chamber of Commerce 
became a business school entirely dedicated to entrepreneurship, which is a unique position in 
the French higher education landscape. During six years, the business school carried out a 
profound transformation of its Bachelor and Master, launched new vocational learning 
programs for managers and entrepreneurs, a center of research in entrepreneurship, a club of 
entrepreneurs, a business angel’s network, and a school incubator whereby novice 
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entrepreneurs start up sixty to eighty new ventures every year. This repositioning had 
manifold implications in terms of legitimacy acquisition. The business school put into practice 
several strategies aiming to demonstrate the quality of its processes and outcomes so as to 
achieve academic, market and political legitimacies. In December 2008, the school became a 
member of the “Conférence des Grandes Ecoles”, one of the most prestigious quality labels in 
French higher education.  
 
III.3. Data collection 
We used various sources of data in order to empirically test and refine our legitimation 
framework over a period of six years’ field research, from 2004 to 2010. We employed 
participant observation
1
 and semi-directed interviews, and we surveyed the business school’s 
archival documentation and publications. We collected and analyzed official documents, 
which specify the business school’s position, business plan and programs, faculty 
descriptions, web and press material. Paper and electronic documentation, including minutes 
of meetings and managers’ memos, are related to the shaping of strategic choices and 
priorities and highlight many concurrent internal negotiations aiming to prioritize one form of 
legitimacy over another. The articulation of data extracted from participant observation, 
interviews and document analysis facilitated triangulation, which strengthened the internal 
validity of our case study (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1984). At the end of fieldwork, 50 semi-
directed interviews were conducted with the business school founder and the founding team 
(professors, researchers, and administrative staff); from the very beginning of the case study, 
the two authors engaged in complete participant observation, with over 300 daily staff 
meetings over a period of 6 years, which addressed strategic and operational issues. 
                                                          
1
 The authors were professionally involved with the business school : one of the authors was the Head of the 
Master program from 2005 to 2008, then the school’s Director from 2008 to 2010; the other author was a Master 
and Bachelor professor from 2005 to 2008, then the Head of the Master program from 2008 to 2010. 
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III.4. Data analysis 
 We analyzed the data using the legitimation framework and the quality assurance 
indicators shown in Table 1. We first coded and categorized verbal and written data according 
to three main categories – academic, market, and political legitimacies; second, we organized 
data within these three categories according to the specific quality assurance indicators of 
each form of legitimacy. We systematically recorded both temporal and contextual 
environments so as to record the chronological dimension of the overall legitimation process 
of the business school. Data interpretation is based on the idea that legitimation strategies may 
be conceptualized as “organizational goals” (Woodword, Edwards and Birkin, 1996). The 
formulation of organizational goals includes sharpening and clarifying present organizational 
purposes, adding new objectives or relinquishing old ones, shifting priorities among 
objectives, and altering the major mission of the organization.  
In order to legitimate a heterogeneous organizational identity, the business school had 
to articulate the pursuit of its numerous and varied organizational goals as specific means or 
sub-goals of acquiring academic, market and political legitimacies (see Table 1). Mintzberg 
and Lampel (1999) identified four main configurations of strategic goal-striving within 
organizations: a) combination of existing goals in one unique global objective; b) systematic 
pursuit of existing goals treated as constraints to be meet at a minimum level of performance; 
c) maximization of one goal, while all the others are treated as constraints; d) consecutive 
maximization of existing goals, so as to meet them successively at their maximum level of 
performance. The longitudinal case study analysis provided a chronological reconstruction of 
the business school’s strategic goal configuration in what concerns the achievement of 
legitimacy. 
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The case study indicates that the business school successively strived to attain the 
three types of legitimacy throughout the first eight years after its foundation. The 
organization’s strategic goal-striving may be thus be qualified as a “consecutive maximization 
of existing goals” in Mintzberg’s and Lampel’s (ibid.) terms, that is the consecutive achieving 
of academic, market and political legitimacies. 
Table 1 
FRAMEWORK OF LEGITIMACY FORMS AND QUALITY ASSURANCE 
INDICATORS IN ENTREPRENEURSHIP EDUCATION ORGANIZATIONS   
 
 
IV. FINDINGS 
The business school’s evolution from 2004 to 2010 indicates a strategy of consecutive 
maximization of existing goals. During this period, the business school moved through five 
FORMS OF 
LEGITIMACY DEFINITION KEYWORD STAKEHOLDERS TYPE OF INDICATORS 
QUALITY ASSURANCE 
INDICATORS 
(organizational macro-level)         (organizational micro-level) 
ACADEMIC 
LEGITIMACY 
the level of 
conformity to 
social norms and 
values, and to the 
rules and 
regulations of 
authority 
institutions  
LEARNING 
national and 
international 
accreditation 
institutions;           
media; scholars   
process and content-based 
quality indicators 
the consistence of pedagogical 
processes linking pedagogical 
content and methods to faculty 
composition and  
organizational design ; the 
school's pedagogical and 
research performance; the 
quality and involvement of the 
faculty in fulfilling the school's 
mission 
MARKET LEGITIMACY 
the level of 
conformity of  
pedagogical 
content and skill 
development to the 
needs of the 
market and firms  
WORKING 
national and 
international firms; 
professional 
associations; 
alumni; media 
process and content-based 
quality indicators;  short- 
and mid-term output 
indicators 
the quality of alumni 
employment (economic 
sectors, type and size of firms, 
functions and responsibilities, 
wages) ; national vs. 
international jobs 
POLITICAL 
LEGITIMACY 
the level of 
conformity to local 
development 
requirements in 
terms of startups 
and new jobs 
creation, growth 
and 
internationalization 
DEVELOPING  
regional, national 
and European 
political actors; 
investment banks; 
Business angels; 
media 
short- and mid-term output 
indicators 
the business school's economic 
performance in terms of 
business creation and 
development; quantitative and 
qualitative indicators for public 
and private funding; reputation 
and external recognition of 
economic expertise (school's 
involvement in regional, 
national and European 
entrepreneurship policy-
making)  
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main phases of legitimacy building; each of them lasted between 12 and 18 months and 
focused on a specific legitimacy achievement, while the two other forms of legitimacy that 
were not prioritized at that moment were treated as constraints (a strategic goal-striving 
configuration acknowledged by Minzberg and Lempel, ibid.). We present here the overall 
legitimation process of an educational organization committed to establishing 
entrepreneurship as a recognized field of higher education, research and professionalization. 
We will thus emphasize the complex process of organizational legitimation that first began 
with an organizational identity-ascription and lead to a long journey of legitimacy assertion 
and identity reconfiguration.  
 
IV.1. The founding years 
 From 2004 to the mid-2006, the business school focused first on achieving political 
legitimacy, then on acquiring academic legitimacy. Paris Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
launched the business school as an educational organization fully dedicated to economic 
development, aiming to enhance entrepreneurial intentions in young students, encourage new 
firm creation, support high-growth companies, and contribute to the sustainability of young 
enterprises in the Paris area. Therefore, the initial organizational identity-ascription positioned 
the business school as an entrepreneurship higher education organization, which was a 
singular position in the French educational landscape at that time. The founding of the 
business school was in conformity with a broader political agenda. Following Commissioner 
Verheugen’s 2002 and 2003 proposals to stimulate entrepreneurial initiatives in the EU and at 
the initiative of Minister Renaud Dutreil, the French Parliament voted several laws that 
significantly encouraged entrepreneurial activity and development. In order to support 
Dutreil’s vision, the Paris Chamber of Commerce decided in December 2004 to reposition the 
business school, which for several decades had been a classical business school of middle 
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management, as a business school dedicated to entrepreneurship. The new educational 
organization was meant to train a new generation of French opportunity-responsible and 
growth-motivated entrepreneurs. In order to produce political and academic legitimacies, the 
business school articulated a consistent stream of external communication claiming that the 
business school’s purpose was to train entrepreneurs, trigger firms’ creation, and develop 
entrepreneurial culture.  
This political mission, recurrently stressed as one of the business school’s key 
features, informed the academic profile of the business school. In 2005, the business school 
launched a Master’s program in entrepreneurship and a school incubator. In 2006, the 
Bachelor’s program was re-designed with an entrepreneurship-based curriculum. A new 
research center was established, with young professors specialized in entrepreneurship. These 
strategic operations indicate that from 2005 until the middle of 2006 the main legitimacy 
focus was on academic issues rather than political concerns. With the intention to concentrate 
more human and financial resources onto an original but expensive pedagogy, the business 
school progressively closed its older programs that were not directly connected to 
entrepreneurship and encouraged professors to develop new skills in entrepreneurship 
education. The school’s ability to experiment with new pedagogical methods and tools was 
then significantly improved, as well as its teaching and research quality. In contrast with other 
business schools that had developed incubators without integrating them into their curricula, 
pedagogical managers were keen on facilitating the access of all students to the school’s 
incubator, either for collective virtual start-up projects or for starting up their own businesses.  
For the pedagogical and research teams, the challenge was to build and convey a 
distinctive educational model, a strong “pedagogy of entrepreneurship”, as opposed to 
mainstream management education. Kyrö and Carrier (2005: 25) called for an “action-based 
pedagogy” in entrepreneurship, with more computerized and behavioural simulations, games, 
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role-playing, films, experiential approaches, more original and unconventional teaching 
methods. Students enrolled in the business school’s entrepreneurship curricula need to 
develop their ability to think critically and to revise existing stores of knowledge and abilities 
through knowledge production in “real life” situations (Binks, Starkey, and Mahon 2006: 15). 
Experiential learning modules were therefore implemented with the purpose of enabling 
students to act and think more autonomously and responsibly: “the main learning benefit of 
experiential methods is to enhance the students' ability to become actors of their own learning 
processes and, consequently, of their entrepreneurial behaviours”, explained the Head of the 
Bachelor Program. Still, “experiential learning methods are a challenge for quality 
assessment in higher education, since the relationship between learning objectives and 
learning outcomes may be more difficult to evaluate because of the holistic approach of the 
pedagogical situation”, observed the professor in charge of coordinating the AACSB 
accreditation process. Thus, the use of experiential methods may actually delay the 
organization's academic and market legitimization processes: as the business school’s 
Director noticed, “our pedagogy may be difficult to evaluate through commonly shared 
management quality indicators, and thus the academic legitimacy of entrepreneurship 
curricula making extensive use of experiential methods may be ultimately endangered”.  
 
IV.2. Striving to get market legitimacy 
In order to get more financial and human resources, the business school became in 
2007 part of a holding together with another business school specialized in trade and 
international affairs, that had already been developing for fifteen years a Bachelor’s and a 
Master’s program entirely dedicated to commerce and negotiation. At that time, the business 
school we researched was still exploring and inventing its academic distinctiveness, but the 
main focus was on achieving market legitimacy.  
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As the new Bachelor’s and Master’s programs were sending to the market their first 
alumni, the challenge was to demonstrate that former students were either entrepreneurs or 
business developers within SMEs and large corporations. Constant efforts were made to 
encourage students to start up their own business and become entrepreneurs within the school 
incubator: 20 new firms were created during the first year, 35 during the second, and 50 
during the third. In order to support the growth of these young enterprises, a Club of 
entrepreneurs was created at the end 2005. In 2007, the incubator launched a post-incubation 
program, the “Business Angels’ Tour”, a specific training program where the best 
entrepreneurs had the opportunity to meet business angels and convince them to invest in their 
businesses. Thanks to the initial efforts put in building political legitimacy, regional financial 
actors were already involved in the business school’s activities and were interested in 
investing time and money in the new firms’ development. Moreover, later that year, the 
business school was invited to contribute to a national training program for business angels, 
the school’s ability in training business investors for start-ups was thus acknowledged and its 
market legitimacy in terms of business creation received national recognition.  
At the same time, the business school was preoccupied with evaluating students’ 
employment as business developers. French firms were initially rather reluctant to hire 
“entrepreneurial profiles”: HR managers of large companies feared that they may be too 
aggressive or too individualistic; business-owners at the head of SMEs feared that they may 
“steal” their good ideas and become future competitors. One of the school’s objectives was to 
demonstrate that students-entrepreneurs were competitive future employees, therefore able to 
launch and develop innovative business projects. Regular meetings and events with corporate 
representatives were organized to jointly identify the best employment opportunities for 
students with an entrepreneurial academic background. As a result, at the end of 2007, 95% of 
the Master’s students were appropriately employed or created their own businesses within six 
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months after graduation and 86% of the Bachelor’s students were offered a choice of three 
internships at the end of their program. In 2008, 25% of the firms involved in the business 
school’s activities conveyed their interest in developing pedagogical projects in corporate 
entrepreneurship with Master’s students. This is a good market recognition indicator, as only 
10% of French firms are concerned with corporate entrepreneurship. 
The organization and functioning of higher education programs specialized in 
management traditionally juxtaposed business schools and enterprises as the two faces of a 
binary system. Entrepreneurship curricula challenged this model and progressively replaced it 
with an educational paradigm whose intention is to systematically articulate business schools 
with enterprises and business incubators into an "open learning environment". Kyrö and 
Carrier (ibid.: 29) noticed that, in many cases, new university structures are needed for 
entrepreneurship education. These structures allow students to circulate within an 
entrepreneurial environment conceptualized as an "open environment" (ibid.). Ideally, 
entrepreneurship scholars imagine this "open environment" as a pedagogical setting where 
there would be no boundaries between the classroom and the surrounding reality, or between 
academic disciplines and economic actors. Learning in such an open environment could 
therefore consist in “increasing and supporting competences for enjoying and acting in 
complexity and insecurity and recognizing as well as creating opportunities involved in it” 
(ibid.: 28). 
Business schools entirely dedicated to entrepreneurship are therefore not only in a 
partnership relation with various enterprises; these schools effectively and directly contribute 
to business creation and development. Consequently, they need to continuously optimize their 
pedagogical approaches and design specific pathways between their academic curricula and 
school incubators. However, in terms of academic legitimacy, the business school “was facing 
a strong dilemma when we were asked to explain the role of the school’s incubator” stressed 
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the Director of the incubator. An incubator coach noticed that “national and international 
accreditation institutions do not take into account the school incubators' pedagogical 
contribution because they do not deliver degrees, even though they can deliver credits”. 
Several French business schools, rather than developing their own incubator, therefore 
preferred to work in partnership with already existing private and public incubators.  
 
IV.3. Amongst the best French academic institutions 
From 2008 to 2009, the business school strived to reinforce its academic legitimacy: 
teaching quality and curricula consistency became major issues in the attempt to enhance the 
school’s attractiveness and consolidate its notoriety among the other 200 French business 
schools. At the national level, the business school struggled to reach the “Conférence des 
Grandes Ecoles” label, which recognizes the academic excellence of 40 French business 
schools. In order to get this national accreditation, the Master’s program was re-designed to 
develop three profiles that pointed out the evolution of the school’s identity – entrepreneurs, 
business developers, business support and consulting specialists. Eager to defend an 
interdisciplinary approach of entrepreneurship, the research team considerably contributed to 
the school’s academic legitimacy. At the end of 2008, the business school received the 
“Grande Ecole” accreditation. The school’s success in training entrepreneurs, business 
developers, and entrepreneurial consulting specialists was therefore acknowledged, as well as 
its research capacity in building a robust interdisciplinary approach to entrepreneurship. At 
that moment, the business school’s educational model acquired national academic legitimacy. 
Immediately afterwards, the school decided to face an additional challenge in order to boost 
its international academic recognition: the business school officially entered the AACSB 
accreditation process at the beginning of 2010.  
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Pretorius et al. (2005) argue that entrepreneurship education challenged the 
functioning of traditional management programs’ pedagogical teams, who classically 
distinguished between academics and business experts. Entrepreneurship pedagogical teams 
introduce a new role, that of the “facilitator” standing at the core of the entrepreneurial 
educational system. Ideally, a good facilitator should increase the students' motivation and 
entrepreneurial intentions, as well as develop the students' entrepreneurial and business skills 
according to market, social and cultural requirements. In reality, the facilitator's role is often 
achieved not by a sole isolated individual but rather by an entire group of academics, business 
professionals and coaches. “We noticed a progressive and profound hybridization of the 
original profiles, with professors becoming entrepreneurs, business professionals becoming 
professors, and the head of the entrepreneurs' club preparing a thesis in entrepreneurship”, 
stressed the school Director. From an academic standpoint, “it is obvious that the legitimacy 
of this kind of heterogeneous entrepreneurial pedagogical teams may sound dubious: their 
various expertises and their status flexibility could be beneficial for the students' skill 
acquisition, but they may also puzzle the quality standards of accreditation institutions”, 
observed the professor in charge of the AACSB accreditation process.  
 
IV.4. Consolidating political legitimacy 
 From 2009 to 2010, the business school put great efforts in achieving international 
recognition, mainly through consolidating political legitimacy at the European level. A close 
examination of international academic partners indicated that, over the past 20 years, the 
school had developed numerous and various partnerships with academic institutions. 
However, very few of them were genuinely interested in entrepreneurship. After visiting 
several potential and actual partners in Northern and Eastern Europe as well as Northern 
Africa, the business school issued the hypothesis that universities were not the best allies in 
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helping French students and professors to understand the development of young firms abroad. 
Local business networks, business associations, entrepreneurial think tanks, and foreign 
agencies for innovation and development were identified as more appropriate future partners. 
As a consequence, the business school organized international meetings so as to attract the 
right partners for new international pedagogical projects.  
In 2006, the business school launched a national conference on women entrepreneurs 
that became an international research seminar in 2007 and 2008. In 2008, Glamorgan 
University (UK) invited the business school to join the first European project on women 
entrepreneurs (WEEU). In 2008 and 2009, the business school organized an international 
conference for French and American entrepreneurs. In 2010, the Danish representation office 
in Brussels commissioned the business school to design an original mapping method of EU’s 
sensitization activities to entrepreneurship along with other eleven European partners, the 
majority of which belonged to European political networks. In the same year, the French 
Ministries of Economy and Higher Education designated the business school as the leader of 
one of the twenty French “poles of excellence for student entrepreneurship”, which was a 
major political recognition of the school’s ability to integrate academic, business and 
institutional partners to boost entrepreneurship (see Figure 1).  
FIGURE 1 
BUILDING LEGITIMACY: A CHRONOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION 
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V. DISCUSSION 
 In this extreme case, entrepreneurship education strives to simultaneously achieve 
academic, market and political legitimacies. Sometimes, as we have seen, the three processes 
of legitimation happen to be convergent, while other times they may become rather divergent 
and thus be the source of strong tensions within entrepreneurship curricula and higher 
education organizations. Even though the business school achieved growing legitimacy from 
2004 to 2010, the strategic decision to consecutively maximize one type of legitimacy at a 
time, while treating the other two as constraints, has an impact on the various Quality 
Assurance Indicators (QAI) to be implemented and regularly evaluated in the attempt to get 
external recognition. When concurrently working on quality assurance indicators, there is a 
risk of conveying the same information to academic, market and political stakeholders, that is, 
to convey counter-productive information about irrelevant quality assurance indicators, 
instead of focusing solely on the quality assurance indicators that are separately relevant to 
academic, marketing or political legitimacy. At the same time, working in concert on the three 
main categories of quality assurance indicators may bring about cognitive and organizational 
difficulties for staff and professors. This process required a great amount of flexibility from 
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the business school’s management and a great ability in building an appropriate 
communication strategy.  
Concretely, in spite of their clear convergence, we observed frequent divergences 
among the staff, especially between those respectively dedicated to market and academic 
legitimacies, or between those respectively involved in developing academic and political 
legitimacies. We also identified some overlapping activities in achieving the three 
legitimacies, as follows: the students’ selection and follow-up, the vaporization of the 
faculty’s intellectual output, the quest for entrepreneurial innovative pedagogical methods, 
and the integration of four different educational communities around the topic of 
entrepreneurship - the incubator’s community of entrepreneurs and coaches, the network of 
experts supported by the sensitization programs, and the research and faculty communities. 
However, conflicts arose in relation to the human and financial resources to be mobilized in 
pursuit of the three types of legitimacy. For instance, the development of entrepreneurship 
relied on political legitimacy, that is, on the ability to obtain public support and funding, 
whereas corporate entrepreneurship development relied on market legitimacy, that is, on the 
ability to attract corporate funds and partnerships. Another area of disagreement was the 
designing of programs targeting specific entrepreneurial populations (such as women, 
immigrants or young entrepreneurs) and industries: for those focusing on political legitimacy, 
these programs were valuable, whereas those committed to developing market legitimacy 
feared that a niche strategy would cut off the school from other potential clients and economic 
partners. These organizational contradictions and paradoxes when attempting to articulate the 
three types of legitimacy-acquisition had a powerful impact on the evolution of pedagogical 
contents, methods and teams and the overall school organization.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
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Throughout the last twenty years, in developed countries, governments and business 
schools put forward the expansion of entrepreneurship education in order to enhance the 
number of start-ups, emphasized as key players of innovation and economic growth. Many 
entrepreneurial programs and organizations therefore emerged to sustain this political, 
economic and cultural agenda, such as educational programs, business incubators and 
nurseries, entrepreneurial clubs and networks. In this context, entrepreneurial education deals 
with several issues that are not exclusively academic in nature. Of course, curriculum 
development, along with the constitution of appropriate pedagogical teams and effective 
student recruitment are at the core of entrepreneurship higher education. In addition, 
entrepreneurial programs and business schools also deal with market expectations and 
requirements in terms of skills acquisition. In other words, these programs and organizations 
need to ensure that those graduates who are not ready to start their own business after 
graduation will still be able to find appropriate positions in already existing companies, as 
managers or consultants. This extreme case indicates that entrepreneurship education 
sometimes requires an organizational strategic reconfiguration and, thus, the implementation 
of a set of consistent processes to manage organizational identity change over time as it 
attempts to gain academic, market and political legitimacies.   
This case also illustrates the various tensions and contradictions facing a higher 
institution dedicated to entrepreneurship when trying to achieve academic, market and 
political legitimacy. In this context, acquiring academic legitimacy is about challenging the 
field of management and its capacity to welcome a new discipline, i.e. new pedagogical 
contents, methods, faculty, and organization, and to elaborate new quality objectives and 
indicators. The business schools' efforts to acquire academic legitimacy are not exclusive, as 
the business school was also involved in two complementary processes targeting market and 
political legitimacies. Tensions are expected since the three legitimizing processes have 
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distinct aims: the accreditation institutions, when it comes to academic legitimacy: public and 
private organizations and firms, when it comes to market legitimacy; and the French 
government and EU institutions, when it comes to political legitimacy.  
Several authors have already emphasized the importance of acquiring market and 
political legitimacies for higher education curricula (Starkey and Tiratsoo, 2007; Lorange, 
2008). However, little is known about the way in which entrepreneurship education may re-
articulate these three types of legitimacy that management education frequently presents as 
uniquely stemming out of the market of higher education. For instance, this case indicates that 
a school does not always comply with market requirements when it acts in accordance with 
political requirements. Conversely, it also indicates that academic and political legitimacies 
may clash when trying to use the same quality assessment criteria. In order to equally and 
simultaneously respond to these three legitimizing processes, entrepreneurship education may 
need to further challenge major educational categories, such as the notions of “pedagogical 
contents”, “methods”, and “teams”, as well as the educational environment and organizations.  
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